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The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress:
Lessons from the Great Depression
David C. Wheelock
This article examines the federal response to mortgage distress during the Great Depression: It
documents features of the housing cycle of the 1920s and early 1930s, focusing on the growth of
mortgage debt and the subsequent sharp increase in mortgage defaults and foreclosures during the
Depression. It summarizes the major federal initiatives to reduce foreclosures and reform mortgage
market practices, focusing especially on the activities of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
(HOLC), which acquired and refinanced one million delinquent mortgages between 1933 and 1936.
Because the conditions under which the HOLC operated were unusual, the author cautions against
drawing strong policy lessons from the HOLC’s activities. Nonetheless, similarities between the
Great Depression and the recent episode suggest that a review of the historical experience can pro-
vide insights about alternative policies to relieve mortgage distress. (JEL E44, G21, G28, N12, N21)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 2008, 90(3, Part 1), pp. 133-48.
mortgages, and 20.4 percent of adjustable-rate
subprime mortgages were seriously delinquent
(i.e., with payments at least 90 days past due or
in foreclosure). In that quarter, 0.9 percent of all
mortgages, 3.7 percent of subprime mortgages,
and 5.7 percent of adjustable-rate subprime mort-
gages entered the foreclosure process.2 Many
analysts predict that house prices will continue
to fall and that mortgage delinquency and foreclo-
sure rates will remain high until 2009 or beyond.
The severe distress in housing and mortgage
markets has prompted numerous proposals to
stem the tide of loan defaults and foreclosures.
Government officials have encouraged lenders to
modify the terms of existing loans to reduce loan
payments and thereby lower default rates, while
T
he growth in U.S. house prices peaked
in 2005 and has since fallen rapidly.
By late 2006, a national index began to
show an outright decline in U.S. house
prices, and some analysts forecast that prices
could fall 10 percent or more nationally.1 Mort-
gage delinquencies and foreclosures have risen
sharply as the growth in house prices has slowed.
As of the fourth quarter of 2007, 3.6 percent of
residential mortgages, 14.4 percent of subprime
1 In an August 2005 interview, Robert Shiller predicted U.S. house
prices could fall by 40 percent (Leonhardt, 2005). The S&P/Case-
Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index began to fall in the third
quarter of 2006. The house price index for purchase transactions
produced by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO) declined for the first time (since 1993) in the third quarter
of 2007. The OFHEO index is based on data for mortgages pur-
chased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two large government-
sponsored enterprises that purchase and securitize home mortgages
valued below a conforming limit, which in 2007 was $417,000. The
S&P/Case-Shiller index is based on data that include mortgages
that exceed this limit; it thereby includes data on more-expensive
homes that nationally have tended to show more-rapid price appre-
ciation followed by more-rapid depreciation during the recent
cycle than less-expensive homes.
2 By contrast, less than 2 percent of all residential mortgages and less
than 6 percent of subprime mortgages were seriously delinquent
during 2005, when just 0.4 percent of all residential mortgages and
1.5 percent of all subprime mortgages entered foreclosure. These
are non-seasonally adjusted data from the Mortgage Bankers
Association (Haver Analytics).
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to limit mortgage market practices that many
observers believe have contributed to high default
rates.3 The Bush administration authorized
expanded use of Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) guarantees to refinance subprime home
mortgages and requested legislation to raise FHA
loan limits and ease down payment requirements
for FHA-guaranteed loans.4 Other proposals on
the table include (i) directing Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, the two main government-sponsored
enterprises that purchase and securitize home
mortgages, to refinance subprime mortgages; (ii)
permitting states to refinance loans at risk of fore-
closure through the issuance of federal tax-exempt
mortgage revenue bonds; and (iii) creating a new
federal corporation to purchase distressed mort-
gages from investors and convert them to 30-year
fixed-rate mortgages.5
The creation of a new federal corporation to
purchase distressed mortgages would mimic a
similar agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corpora-
tion (HOLC), that was established to purchase
delinquent home mortgages during the Great
Depression. Many observers have noted that the
recent increase in home mortgage defaults resem-
bles the experience of the Great Depression, when
a tidal wave of home mortgage defaults also
occurred. This article takes a look back at the
Great Depression experience and identifies differ-
ences and similarities with the current episode.
As with the current episode, the increase in mort-
gage defaults during the Depression was preceded
by a period of extensive home building and rising
house prices and an increasing use of debt to
finance house purchases. Defaults rose sharply
in the early 1930s when house prices and house-
hold incomes collapsed. The tidal wave of mort-
gage defaults and foreclosures prompted calls for
government help, and the federal government, as
well as state and local governments, responded
quickly with a variety of programs to alleviate
the distress in mortgage markets.
This article first documents features of the
housing boom of the 1920s and describes the
evolution of home mortgage finance during that
decade. It then examines the collapse of house
prices and increase in mortgage defaults during
the 1930s and describes how the federal govern-
ment responded to the wave of home mortgage
defaults during the Depression. Although the arti-
cle summarizes each of the major initiatives, it
focuses primarily on the activities of the HOLC,
which was the principal vehicle by which the
federal government sought to resolve delinquent
home mortgages. The HOLC has been cited as a
model for how the government could resolve the
current wave of mortgage defaults. However, as
this article points out, the conditions under which
the HOLC operated were quite different from
those present today and, hence, the lessons from
the operation of the HOLC for the current episode
are somewhat limited.
THE HOUSING BOOM AND BUST
The recent downturn in U.S. house prices and
construction was preceded by a period of rapid
growth. Between January 2003 and December
2005, single-family housing starts increased at
an average annual rate of 8.5 percent. By contrast,
between January 2006 and December 2007, hous-
ing starts fell at an average annual rate of 21.8
percent.6 The U.S. experienced a similar boom/
bust cycle in housing construction during the
1920s and early 1930s. Annual data for 1900-41
on the number of single-family housing starts are
shown in Figure 1, alongside data on the value
Wheelock
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3 The Federal Reserve proposal is summarized in a press release
dated December 18, 2007: www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20071218a.htm.
4 Details of the Administration’s proposals in response to the sub-
prime mortgage crisis are described in a speech by Treasury
Secretary Paulson on December 3, 2007: www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/hp706.htm.
5 Senator Charles Schumer proposed (i) and (ii) in remarks entitled
“A Call to Action on the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Putting Common
Sense Ahead of Ideology,” delivered at the Brookings Institution
on December 19, 2007. Proposals for the creation of a Federal
Homeownership Preservation Corporation were discussed in hear-
ings before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee on January 31, 2008.
See Barr (2008) and Pollock (2008).
6 The data reported on housing starts are averages of monthly year-
over-year percentage changes. The source of these data is the
Department of Commerce (Haver Analytics).of new single-family housing units (from 1915,
when data are first available, to 1941).7 Construc-
tion of new single- and multi-family housing
stalled during World War I and, after a brief recov-
ery, slumped again during a recession in 1920-21.8
Construction rebounded rapidly as the economy
recovered, however, with peaks in single- and
multi-family home construction reached in 1925
and 1927, respectively. Some authors have argued
that the growth in housing investment during the
1920s outstripped demand. The infamous Florida
land and construction boom, which ended with
a hurricane in September 1926, is the most-often
cited occurrence of a housing bubble.9 However,
many authors contend that real estate speculation
was widespread, fueled by lax lending standards
and the ease with which securities could be sold
to finance construction (e.g., Gordon, 1974, p. 35).
Interest rates began to rise in 1928 when the
Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy to
stem speculative activity, especially in the stock
market, and housing investment began to fall.
Housing starts plunged sharply after the business
cycle peak in mid-1929. Some authors contend
that the decline in housing investment in 1928-29
contributed to the onset of the Great Depression,
though that view is not widely held today.10
House prices, shown in Figure 2, followed a
path that was similar to that of construction.
Wheelock
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Figure 1
Single-Family Housing Starts and Value of New Units, 1900-41
7 Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the
Present: Millennial Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2006),
series Dc511 and Dc257.
8 According to Doan (1997, pp. 27-28), housing starts were at their
lowest level since the 1870s during World War I and the 1920 reces-
sion, resulting in a severe housing shortage and rapidly rising rents.
9 See, for example, Allen (1957, Chap. 11).
10 Although Hickman (1960, pp. 320-21) and Gordon (1974, pp. 70-71)
link the onset of the Depression to the downturn in housing invest-
ment, most recent studies attribute the onset of the Depression
either to restrictive monetary policy (e.g., Friedman and Schwartz,
1963; Hamilton, 1987) or an unspecified adverse technology shock
(e.g., Cole and Ohanian, 1999). See Parker (2007) for a survey of
recent research on the causes of the Great Depression.Wheelock
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Figure 3
Mortgage Debt OutstandingIn the aggregate, house prices rose to a peak in
1925; then, after declining slowly, prices fell
sharply as the Depression took hold. The decline
in house prices during 1929-33 was comparable
to the decline in consumer prices, however; thus,
inflation-adjusted (i.e., real) house prices, also
shown in Figure 2, changed little.11
Home mortgage debt outstanding increased
rapidly during the 1920s and continued to grow
even after housing starts had begun to decline
and house prices had leveled off. Figure 3 plots
the dollar value of outstanding mortgage debt on
all residential properties from 1900 to 1941 and
on 1- to 4-family properties from 1925 to 1941.
(Data for 1- to 4-family properties are not available
before 1925.) Data on the real value of outstand-
ing mortgage debt are also shown in the figure.
Although the nominal value of mortgage debt
peaked in 1930 and then declined, deflation
caused the real value of outstanding mortgage
debt to continue to rise until 1932. Thus, consis-
tent with Fisher’s (1933) classic “debt-deflation”
theory, the burden of outstanding mortgage debt
increased sharply during the contraction phase
of the Great Depression and economic recovery
did not begin until the real value of outstanding
debt had begun to decline.12
A rising level of debt does not necessarily
pose a problem for households, so long as house-
hold incomes and wealth are sufficient to make
loan payments. However, household incomes and
wealth declined rapidly during the Depression.
Moreover, falling house prices made it less likely
that a homeowner who was having difficulty mak-
ing his mortgage payments could sell his property
Wheelock
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11 The nominal house price index data shown in Figure 2 are series
Dc826 from Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times
to the Present: Millennial Edition (2006). The real price index is the
nominal index divided by the consumer price index (1982-84 = 100).
12 The NBER identifies the business cycle trough as being in the first
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Figure 4
Nonfarm Residential Mortgage Debt as a Percentage of Nonfarm Residential Wealth
SOURCE: Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, 1956. Table L-6.for more than the outstanding balance on his loan.
From 1929 to 1932, personal disposable income
and nonfarm residential wealth fell 41.0 percent
and 25.7 percent, respectively, whereas the value
of nonfarm residential debt declined by just 6.8
percent. As shown in Figure 4, relative to nonfarm
residential wealth, residential mortgage debt out-
standing increased sharply throughout the 1920s
and continued to rise until 1932.13 Thus, as resi-
dential property became increasingly leveraged
during the 1920s, the declines in household
incomes and wealth after 1929 made servicing
that debt especially difficult for homeowners.
The rapid increases in building activity,
house prices, and mortgage debt during the 1920s
are characteristics shared with the recent U.S.
housing boom. The 1920s witnessed an increase
in loan-to-value ratios and frequent use of high
interest rate secondary loans, which is also remi-
niscent of the recent experience (Doan, 1997, p. 35;
Dovenmuehle, 1965, p. 2). Further, according to
some commentators, lending standards in the
1920s were unusually lax (Saulnier, 1956, p. 10).
Thus, on the eve of the Great Depression, many
homeowners were not well positioned to with-
stand the substantial decline in income or house
prices that would occur over the next three years.
MORTGAGE DISTRESS DURING
THE DEPRESSION
As the U.S. economy contracted, loan delin-
quencies and foreclosures soared, fueled by falling
household incomes and property values. Many
home loans had terms of five years or less and
often involved no, or only partial, payment of
principal before a balloon payment was due when
the loan matured or was refinanced.14 Refinanc-
ing was common and easily accomplished in the
1920s, an environment of rising incomes and
property values, but next to impossible during
the Depression. Falling incomes made it increas-
ingly difficult for borrowers to make loan pay-
ments or to refinance outstanding loans as they
came due. The failure of thousands of banks and
other lenders contributed to the difficulty of refi-
nancing, as customer relationships were severed
and the costs of credit intermediation rose.15
At its worst, in 1933, some 1,000 home loans
were foreclosed every day (Fifth Annual Report
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1937, p. 4).
Figure 5 plots annual data on the mortgage fore-
closure rate from 1926, when data are first avail-
able, to 1941. The foreclosure rate increased
continuously from 1926 to 1933, then declined
slowly over the remainder of the period. The fore-
closure rate exceeded 1 percent (10 per 1,000
mortgages) in each year from 1931 to 1935 and did
not fall below the rate for the year 1926 until 1941.
The rate of foreclosures would likely have been
far higher were it not for the moratoria on (and
other impediments to) foreclosure imposed by
several states (Poteat, 1938), as well as the actions
of the federal government to refinance delinquent
mortgages, which are discussed later in this
article.16
A broader measure of home mortgage distress
is the rate of mortgages with past due payments.
Comprehensive data on mortgage delinquency
rates do not exist for the 1930s. However, a study
of 22 cities by the Department of Commerce
found that, as of January 1, 1934, 43.8 percent of
urban, owner-occupied homes on which there
was a first mortgage were in default. The study
also found that among delinquent loans, the aver-
age time that they had been delinquent was 15
Wheelock
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13 Data on personal disposable income are from Historical Statistics
of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial
Edition (2006), series Ca68. Data on nonfarm residential wealth
and nonfarm residential mortgage debt are from Grebler, Blank,
and Winnick (1956, Table L-6).
14 Lending terms varied widely across lenders. Although mortgages
made by savings and loan associations (S&Ls) were usually fully
amortizing, those made by life insurance companies and commercial
banks often included no, or only partial, repayment of principal
over the life of the loan and were usually for shorter terms than
those made by S&Ls. See Morton (1956) for more information about
the mortgage market and loan characteristics during the 1920s.
15 Bernanke (1983) argues that financial failures increase the cost of
credit intermediation and finds evidence that failures contributed
significantly to the decline in output during the Great Depression.
16 Relative to delinquency rates, foreclosure rates have been far
higher during the recent period than they were during the Great
Depression. Some analysts contend that mortgage securitization
and features of bankruptcy law discourage renegotiation of loan
terms as an alternative to foreclosure. See Emmons (2008).months. Among homes with a second or third
mortgage, 54.4 percent were in default and the
average time of delinquency was 18 months.
Thus, at the beginning of 1934, approximately
one-half of urban houses with an outstanding
mortgage were in default (Bridewell, 1938, p. 172).
For comparison, in the fourth quarter of 2007, 3.6
percent of all U.S. residential mortgages and 20.4
percent of adjustable-rate subprime mortgages
had been delinquent for at least 90 days.
Although falling household incomes and
house prices were the principal causes of mort-
gage distress during the Great Depression, lax
underwriting may have contributed to the high
rate of mortgage delinquency. A National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) survey found that,
during the Depression, foreclosure rates were
higher for loans made later in the 1920s than for
those made earlier in the decade, suggesting that
underwriting standards had deteriorated over
time.17 Delinquency rates were also higher for
non-amortizing and high loan-to-value loans
(Morton, 1956, p. 100). Thus, although the proxi-
mate cause of the high rate of loan delinquencies
and foreclosures during the 1930s was the eco-
nomic depression, the likelihood of default on
any given loan apparently was influenced by the
characteristics of the loan itself.18
GOVERNMENT TO THE RESCUE
Federal, state, and local governments took
many actions to provide relief from the effects of
Wheelock
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17 Similarly, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2007) found that the quality
of subprime mortgage loans declined monotonically during 2001-06,
as the subprime loan market expanded rapidly.
18 The NBER study found considerable differences in foreclosure
rates across lender types, which might reflect differences in typical
loan terms, such as amortization or other contract features, between
different types of lenders. However, as Morton (1956) acknowl-
edges, the NBER sample of loans was not random. In particular, it
did not include data for lenders that failed or otherwise went out
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Figure 5
Nonfarm Real Estate Mortgage Foreclosure Rate, 1926-41the Great Depression on housing and mortgage
markets. For example, 33 states enacted legisla-
tion providing relief for those with delinquent
mortgages, including 28 states that imposed mora-
toria on home foreclosures (Poteat, 1938). Many
of the federal government’s actions to alleviate
the Depression affected housing and financial
markets directly or indirectly. For example, legis-
lation was enacted to stabilize the banking system
and to reform securities market practices. Under
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, the
federal government established a temporary pro-
gram for the construction of low-cost housing.
The United States Housing Act of 1937 replaced
this program with a system of federal subsidies
for local government housing projects (Doan,
1997, pp. 39-42).
In addition to programs aimed at providing
affordable housing, the federal government took
several steps to alleviate distress in mortgage
markets. Table 1 lists the major agencies created
during the 1930s to provide liquidity for home
lenders, reduce the number of home loan fore-
closures, and reform the mortgage market. This
section describes the main objectives of each of
these agencies.
Wheelock
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Table 1
Federal Government Agencies Created in Response to Home Mortgage Distress in the 1930s
Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLB)
• Authorized under Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932
• Established 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks
• Created to provide a stable source of funds to member firms for residential-mortgage and economic-development
loans
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC)
• Established by the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation Act of 1933
• Purchased and refinanced distressed mortgages on 1- to 4-family homes, subject to income and loan qualifications
• Issued over one million loans between August 1933 and June 1936
• Liquidated in 1951
Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
• Established by the National Housing Act of 1934
• Offers home mortgage insurance on 1- to 4-family homes
• Intended to stabilize mortgage market and improve housing standards and conditions
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
• Established by the National Housing Act of 1934, administered by FHLB
• Provided deposit insurance for savings and loan associations
• Abolished under Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
• Established in 1938 by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at the request of President Roosevelt
• Created to establish a secondary mortgage market by purchasing FHA-insured loans at par and accrued interest
• 1948 National Housing Act amendment gave FNMA a federal charter to become independent of the RFC;
FNMA given authority to purchase FHA and Veterans Administration (VA)–insured loans
• 1968 Chartered by Congress as a government-sponsored private corporation
SOURCE: Annual Report of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1933, 1934, 1951), Haar (1960), Harris (1951), Fannie Mae website
(www.fanniemae.com/about), and Wallace (1938).Federal Home Loan Bank System and
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation
The Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLB)
was established in 1932 to provide a federal
lender for private institutions that specialize in
home mortgage loans, including savings and
loan associations (S&Ls), mutual savings banks,
and life insurance companies. FHLB membership
was required of all federally chartered S&Ls and
was optional for state-chartered lenders. The
system had an initial capitalization of $125 mil-
lion and was patterned after the Federal Reserve
System, with 12 regional Home Loan Banks and
an oversight Board located in Washington, D.C.
Member institutions were required to purchase
stock in their local Home Loan Bank and could
borrow from the Bank against collateral consist-
ing of mortgages on 1- to 4-family houses or U.S.
government securities (or securities fully guar-
anteed by the U.S. government). Home Loan
Bank operations were financed from their capi-
tal and deposits of member institutions and by
issuing debt. Interest on Home Loan Bank secu-
rities was exempt from federal, state, and local
income taxes, but the securities were not guaran-
teed by the U.S. government.19
The FHLB began to lend in December 1932;
by December 1933, it had over $85 million of
loans outstanding (Fifth Annual Report of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1937, p. 130).
Through 1941, average year-end FHLB advances
outstanding ranged from a low of 1.4 percent of
total member S&L assets in 1934 to a high of 3.5
percent in 1933 and 1937.20
The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) was established by the
National Housing Act of 1934 and placed under
the supervision of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. The FSLIC was created to provide federal
insurance for savings accounts of up to $5000 at
S&Ls. Account insurance was mandatory for all
federally chartered S&Ls and optional for state-
chartered institutions. As with government
insurance of commercial bank deposits, federal
insurance for S&Ls was intended to restore the
confidence of depositors in the safety of savings
accounts and thereby increase the flow of deposits
to savings institutions and discourage panic
withdrawals. By encouraging growth in savings
institution deposits, Congress sought to increase
the amount of funds available for home mortgage
loans.21
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC)
was created as an agency of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board by an act of Congress in 1933.
The HOLC was authorized for a period of three
years to purchase and refinance delinquent home
mortgages, including mortgages on properties
that had recently been foreclosed on. The HOLC
had an initial capitalization of $200 million and
was authorized to issue up to $2 billion (later
increased to $4.75 billion) of bonds to purchase
mortgages on 1- to 4-family properties that were
in default or that had resulted in foreclosure
during the previous 24 months. Interest on securi-
ties issued by the HOLC was exempt from federal,
state, and local income taxes, and the payment
of interest was guaranteed by the federal
government.22
The HOLC was permitted to acquire delin-
quent mortgages on properties with an appraised
value of up to $20,000.23 HOLC loans were lim-
ited to 80 percent of the appraised value of the
underlying property or a maximum of $14,000,
whichever was less. The HOLC sometimes per-
mitted junior liens (second mortgages) on prop-
erties against which it held the first mortgage, but
refused to permit the total obligations on a prop-
Wheelock
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19 See Wallace (1938) for additional information about the organiza-
tion and operations of the FHLB during the 1930s.
20 Data on year-end outstanding FHLB advances and total assets of
member savings and loan associations are from Historical Statistics
of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial
Edition (2006), series Dc1140 and Cj383, respectively.
21 See Wallace (1938) for additional information.
22 A 1934 amendment extended the government guarantee to the
principal on HOLC bonds. See Harriss (1951, pp. 152-56) for
information about HOLC borrowing operations.
23 For comparison, $20,000 in 1933 prices is equivalent to approxi-
mately $320,000 in 2007 prices, as adjusted by the consumer price
index.erty to exceed 100 percent of the appraised value.
Further, the HOLC made loans only to those home-
owners it deemed likely to have sufficient income
to make their loan payments (Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation, 1936, p. 10). Nearly half of the loan
applications received by the HOLC were rejected
or withdrawn (Harriss, 1951, p. 1). Although
many home loans at the time were short-term
loans with little or no amortization of principal,
the HOLC restructured the loans it acquired as
15-year, amortizing loans at a fixed maximum
interest rate of 5 percent.24
The HOLC was authorized to conduct its
own property appraisals and did so based on
three considerations: (i) market value at the time
of the appraisal, (ii) the cost of a similar plot of
land at the time of the appraisal plus the repro-
duction cost of the building minus depreciation,
and (iii) the value of the premises, by capitalizing
the reasonable monthly rental value over a 10-
year period immediately preceding the appraisal
date (Harriss, 1951, p. 41). Harriss (1951, pp. 41-
42) reports that appraisals were often generous,
reflecting more the appraiser’s view about the
long-run value of a property than its current,
depressed value.
Although private lenders from whom the
HOLC purchased loans often suffered a loss on
the nominal value of their original loans, the
HOLC’s liberal appraisals ensured that lenders
preferred to sell many delinquent loans to the
HOLC rather than attempt to recoup their losses
through foreclosure. Between August 1933 and
June 1935, the HOLC received nearly 1.9 million
loan applications. By June 1936, the HOLC made
just over one million loans totaling $3.1 billion.
For comparison, the value of the private U.S.
residential housing stock in 1933 is estimated to
have been $89.7 billion.25 The average HOLC loan
amount was $3,039, and 75 percent were for less
than $4,000. By value, the HOLC accounted for
12 percent of all new mortgages on 1- to 4-family
homes in 1933, 71 percent in 1934, 26 percent in
1935, and just 6 percent in 1936—the last year it
accepted applications for new loans.26 The HOLC
provided refinancing for some 10 percent of all
nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings in the United
States and about 20 percent of those carrying a
mortgage.
Figures 6 and 7 show the distribution of new
and outstanding home mortgages across major
groups of lenders for each year from 1925 to
1941.27 Although the HOLC did not accept new
applications after 1936, it continued to make loans
in later years on property that it foreclosed on
and later resold. The stock of outstanding mort-
gage debt held by the HOLC reached a peak in
1935, when it held nearly 19 percent of all mort-
gage debt outstanding on 1- to 4-family homes.
Thereafter, the HOLC share of outstanding debt
gradually declined as the economy and private
lenders continued to recover. Still, as late as 1941,
the HOLC held about 10 percent of the value of
outstanding residential mortgage debt.
Of the approximately one million loans made
by the HOLC, some 20 percent ended in foreclo-
sure or voluntary transfer of the underlying prop-
erty to the HOLC. Foreclosures peaked during the
recession of 1937-38. The HOLC was not quick to
foreclose on delinquent loans, being “as consid-
erate of delinquent but deserving borrowers as
its responsibility to the Federal Government and
the taxpaying public will permit” (Third Annual
Report of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
1935, p. 600). The HOLC often counseled delin-
quent borrowers and readjusted payment sched-
ules rather than moving quickly to foreclosure
when borrowers fell behind on their payments.
On average, HOLC loans were delinquent for two
years before foreclosure (Harriss, 1951, p. 73).
24 Initially, interest-only terms were granted for the first three years
of a loan. Beginning in 1936, these loans were reamortized as 12-
year fully amortizing loans (Fourth Annual Report of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, 1936, p. 30).
25 Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the
Present: Millennial Edition (2006), Series Dc55.
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26 Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the
Present: Millennial Edition (2006), series Dc983-989.
27 In the figures, institutional lenders include commercial banks,
mutual savings banks, S&Ls, insurance companies, the Federal
National Mortgage Association, and other institutional lenders.
Non-institutional lenders include individuals, mortgage brokers,
construction companies, trust departments of commercial banks,
and others. Data for new and outstanding mortgages are from
Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the
Present: Millennial Edition (2006), series Dc983-989 and series
Dc914-921, respectively.Wheelock
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Outstanding Mortgage Debt by Lender, 1925-41Because the HOLC refinanced distressed
loans, its foreclosure rate was higher than that of
other lenders. For example, the foreclosure rate
on loans made by life insurance companies during
1933-36 was a mere 2.6 percent, compared with
nearly 20 percent for the HOLC (Harriss, 1951,
p. 71). The limitation that HOLC loans not exceed
80 percent of a property’s appraised value proba-
bly held down the agency’s foreclosure rate, as did
its policy of lending only to those borrowers who
had a reasonable prospect of being able to service
their loan. Furthermore, most HOLC loans were
made somewhat after the trough of the business
cycle, and rising household incomes helped to
limit loan default rates.
It is difficult to determine the extent to which
the HOLC contributed to a rebound in the housing
market, let alone to the macroeconomic recovery.
One study of county-level data found little asso-
ciation between HOLC lending and changes in
housing values or homeownership rates between
1930 and 1940 (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor,
2001). Nevertheless, in helping to clear a million
delinquent loans from the books of private lenders,
the HOLC undoubtedly contributed to the resump-
tion of private mortgage lending.
The HOLC was liquidated in 1951. After 1936,
the bulk of its activities consisted of managing
the loans it had made during 1933-36, disposing
of property acquired through foreclosure—includ-
ing making new loans to assist in that process—
and funding its operations. The HOLC never
received a Congressional appropriation other
than its initial $200 million capitalization.28
HOLC loans were funded by the agency’s bond
issues and operating income (interest, property
rental income, etc.). Over its life, the HOLC had
a net cumulative operating income of $352 mil-
lion, against a cumulative capital loss of $338
million, principally from defaults on mortgage
loans it had made. While the rapid growth in
household incomes and property values from
the mid-1930s through the 1940s held down the
default rate on HOLC loans, falling interest rates
reduced the HOLC’s cost of funds, thereby boost-
ing its profit margin on outstanding loans.29
Federal Housing Administration and
Federal National Mortgage Association
The National Housing Act of 1934 created
the FHA to administer a federal mortgage insur-
ance program. The program offered insurance to
approved private lenders on qualifying loans for
the purchase, repair, expansion, or alteration of
existing houses and for the construction of new
houses. Most FHA-insured loans were required
to be fully amortizing, with a maximum interest
rate of 5 percent. When the program began, FHA-
insured loans were limited to $16,000 or less (as
compared with a median U.S. house price of
$5,304) and a maximum loan-to-value ratio of 80
percent. A 1938 amendment permitted the FHA
to extend insurance to mortgages with loan-to-
value ratios of 90 percent on new homes with
mortgages of no more than $5,400 (Carliner, 1998,
p. 306).30 The FHA offered mortgage insurance
both for single-family houses and rental projects.
The FHA was authorized to charge an annual
insurance premium of between 0.5 and 1.0 per-
cent of the outstanding loan principal.
Figure 8 plots annual data for 1935-41 on the
dollar amount of new FHA-insured mortgages
on 1- to 4-family houses and the share of all new
home mortgages insured by the FHA. Private
lenders were not quick to embrace FHA insurance
because of the requirements imposed on FHA-
insured loans, including full amortization and
maximum loan interest rates and fees. By 1938,
FHA-insured loans still represented less than 20
percent of all new mortgage originations.
In addition to creating the FHA and the FSLIC,
the National Housing Act of 1934 authorized the
creation of national mortgage associations, which
Wheelock
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28 Like other government agencies, however, the HOLC received
free government services, such as free use of the postal system,
and was exempt from paying Social Security taxes and overtime
wages (Harriss, 1951, p. 161).
29 The HOLC issued both short-term debt and callable long-term
bonds. The average interest rate paid by the HOLC on its outstand-
ing debt fell from 3.6 percent in 1934 to 2.1 percent in 1939, and
to 1.1 percent in 1945-49 (Harriss, 1951, pp. 152-56). HOLC loans
carried a contract interest rate of 5 percent, which was reduced for
all borrowers to 4.5 percent in October 1939 (Harriss, 1951, p. 5).
30 Initially, loans for repairs, expansion, or alterations of an existing
house were capped at $2,000. By 1938, the cap was raised to
$10,000. See Wallace (1938) for details about the original provisions
associated with FHA insurance and changes made by 1938.were intended to be federally chartered private
organization that bought and sold qualifying first
mortgages. This provision of the National Housing
Act was intended to promote a liquid national
market for mortgages and thereby mobilize capital
for housing finance. In fact, no private mortgage
associations were formed. However, the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation (RFC) established
two subsidiaries to purchase FHA-insured mort-
gages: (i) the RFC Mortgage Company, established
in 1935, and (ii) the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA), established in 1938. The
latter became the principal government purchaser
of FHA-insured loans.31
The FNMA had an initial capitalization of
$10 million and was empowered to buy or sell
any mortgages insured by the FHA. The agency
was authorized to sell bonds to fund its mortgage
purchases; and, although the bonds were not
explicitly guaranteed by the federal government,
a government guarantee was implicit because the
assets of the FNMA were almost entirely invested
in FHA-insured mortgages. The FNMA purchased
some $82 million of mortgages in 1938 and some-
what smaller amounts over the next four years. By
the end of 1941, the agency held a $207 million
portfolio of mortgages, which was approximately
1 percent of the total outstanding mortgages on
1- to 4-family homes at that time.32
CONCLUSION
The recent distress in the U.S. home mort-
gage market has parallels in the experience of
the Great Depression. Like the recent episode,
the increase in mortgage defaults during the
Wheelock
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31 The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was a federal
government agency established in 1932 to make loans to banks
and other businesses, as well as to state and local governments.
The RFC was also authorized to “assist in the reestablishment of a






















FHA Insured Mortgages (left scale)
FHA Insured Share of Total New Mortgages (right scale)
Figure 8
FHA Insured Mortgages by Dollar Amount, 1935-41
32 Data on FNMA purchasers are from Historical Statistics of the
United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition
(2006), series Dc1146. See Quigley (2006) or Weicher (2006) for
information about the activities of the FHA and FNMA since
World War II.Depression coincided with a sharp decline in
house prices after a period of rapid gains. Also
like the recent experience, mortgage defaults
during the Depression were more prevalent on
mortgages with unconventional terms, such as
short-term, non-amortizing loans. Furthermore,
mortgage underwriting standards appear to have
deteriorated before the downturn of the 1930s,
as they did toward the end of the recent housing
boom. However, unlike the recent experience,
the main cause of mortgage loan distress during
the 1930s was the sharply contracting economy
and falling price level. One estimate is that, on
January 1, 1934, about half of all mortgages on
urban, owner-occupied houses were delinquent.33
Not surprisingly, this level of distress prompted
numerous local, state, and federal actions to
relieve and reform mortgage markets.
The federal government responded to the
distress in mortgage markets first by creating a
new federal agency, the Federal Home Loan Bank
System, to provide a source of loans for mortgage
lenders. The federal government then tackled the
problem of delinquent loans directly by creating
the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, which pur-
chased delinquent loans from their originators.
The HOLC purchased some one million loans,
which it refinanced as long-term, fixed-rate, amor-
tizing loans payable in monthly installments.
Arguably, the HOLC was highly successful.
Despite acquiring only delinquent loans, the
HOLC ended up foreclosing on fewer than 20
percent of the loans it refinanced. Furthermore,
the HOLC operated without a direct taxpayer sub-
sidy (other than its initial $200 million capitaliza-
tion, which it eventually repaid). The HOLC did,
however, refuse many loans on the grounds that
the borrower lacked the income to make loan pay-
ments. The HOLC also loaned no more than 80
percent of the appraised value of the underlying
property, though its appraisals were often higher
than the current depressed market values. The
HOLC also benefited financially from an expand-
ing economy, rising house prices, and falling
interest rates, which lowered its funding costs,
especially during World War II.
The sharp increase in mortgage delinquencies
and foreclosures during 2007 prompted numer-
ous calls for government intervention in housing
and mortgage markets, including the creation of
an HOLC-like agency to purchase delinquent
mortgages. The right of lenders to foreclose on
collateral is the main reason why the interest rates
on secured loans, such as home mortgages, are
typically much lower than those on unsecured
loans, such as credit card debt. Ordinarily, mort-
gage foreclosures receive little notice from the
public because they have little impact on parties
other than the delinquent borrower. However,
when the number of foreclosures is high or con-
centrated geographically, they can lower property
values, destabilize neighborhoods, and impose
other social costs. Such “externalities” can justify
government intervention to reduce the number
of foreclosures.
Any government response to mortgage distress
would entail some cost. For example, a govern-
ment purchase of delinquent mortgages, or
expanded federal mortgage guarantees or insur-
ance, could impose a substantial monetary cost
on taxpayers. Some policies, including a govern-
ment bailout of delinquent loans or expanded
loan guarantees, could also encourage increased
financial risk-taking and thereby lead to further
instability in the future. Other actions, such as a
government-imposed moratorium on loan foreclo-
sures, could simply delay inevitable adjustments
that are necessary to restore the functioning of
mortgage and housing markets. Such direct gov-
ernment intervention could also increase the cost
of loans for future borrowers by encouraging
lenders to add a premium to loan interest rates
to compensate for the risk that government offi-
cials might re-write the terms of loan contracts.34
A full assessment of the benefits and costs of
government programs to alleviate mortgage dis-
tress during the Depression requires further
research. There is scant evidence that the acqui-
sition of delinquent mortgages by the HOLC dur-
ing the 1930s encouraged risky lending. However,
the Great Depression experience may not be espe-
Wheelock
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33 Bridewell (1938, p. 172).
34 See Emmons (2008) for more detail on the rationale for government
action to reduce foreclosures and discussion of the costs and
benefits of specific types of intervention.cially relevant for addressing how a taxpayer
bailout of delinquent borrowers and their lenders
would affect behavior today because of differences
in the underlying causes of mortgage distress dur-
ing the two periods. Conceivably, a bailout would
more likely encourage risky behavior in the pres-
ent situation (in which lax underwriting was an
important cause of the increase in defaults) than
during the Depression (when a sharp decline in
economic activity was the main cause of defaults).
Thus, while the federal response to mortgage dis-
tress during the Great Depression provides insights
about how the government might respond to the
current wave of defaults, the very different con-
ditions underlying mortgage distress during the
two periods warns against drawing strong con-
clusions from the historical experience for the
current episode.
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